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Mimesis, Scapegoating and Financial Crises: A Critical Evaluation of René Girard’s 
Intellectual Legacy  
 
JAMES REVELEY AND JOHN SINGLETON* 
ABSTRACT:  René Girard’s pathbreaking work, especially on mimetic (imitative) thought 
and behavior, can be used to reinforce Marxist explanations of financial crisis. Yet Girard’s 
concept of the scapegoat mechanism is less applicable to the modern world, and failure to 
recognize this can lead to confusion. A prime example is the contribution of the neo-Marxist 
scholar Henri Guénin-Paracini and his co-authors, who hold that the same mechanism 
Girard identified as existing in ancient times reconciles workers to contemporary 
capitalism’s financial crisis tendencies. A close analysis of their argument reveals that this 
mechanism explains nothing about post-crisis social reproduction. Nevertheless, Girardian 
cognizance of scapegoating and the persecutory impulse is useful in ensuring that resistance 
to financialization is depersonalized. Girard’s theory of mimesis, however, can contribute to 
a systemic account of factors leading to financial crises. In particular, his mimetic theory has 
the potential to bridge Keynesian and Marxist explanations of why such crises occur. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
René Girard (1923-2015) was a French polymath scholar whose writings traverse 
the academic disciplines of history, literary studies and anthropology. Girard paints on a 
large intellectual canvas, but arguably the most distinctive aspects of his work concern 
mimetic desire and the scapegoat mechanism. In many respects, Girard was a cultural 
theorist. His theory of scapegoating, for example, explains how religion functioned to 
promote social stability in archaic societies wherein violence was an ever-present threat to 
social order. Nevertheless, from the early 1980s Marxist theorists began to exploit Girard’s 
cultural insights by relocating them to the new ground of the economic domain. The idea of 
applying Girard’s theories to the institutions of capitalism is traceable back to Aglietta and 
Orléan (1982). Though Michel Aglietta is a founding father of the French Regulation 
School, it is not widely known outside the French-speaking academic community that he 
marshals Girardian arguments to explain – albeit controversially – the historical origins of 
monetary systems in mimetic (or emulative) desire. Indeed, Grahl (2000) argues that 
Girardian terminology peppers Aglietta’s later work even though he (Aglietta) ceases to 
mention Girard by name. Continuing in this vein, Aglietta’s co-author André Orléan 
explicitly uses Girard’s mimetic theory to explain financial crises (Orléan, 1989; 2014). 
Writing within the autonomist tradition, Marazzi (2015) takes a similar tack. Girard’s 
theory of scapegoating has also recently drawn attention. Importantly, for the purposes of 
our argument, the neo-Marxist scholar Henri Guénin-Paracini and his co-authors claim that 
the scapegoat mechanism functions to sustain financialized capitalism by inuring the 
citizenry to the pernicious effects of financial crisis and by rebuilding public confidence in 
the financial circuit (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014).  
Despite Girard’s work being increasingly mined by Marxists of various stripes, to 
date there has not been a comprehensive, critical appraisal of his intellectual legacy. It is 
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high time to assess more systematically what Girard has to offer Marxist theory and praxis. 
Given Girard’s focus on scapegoats and on imitative thought and behavior, our paper 
evaluates the potential of his work to shed new light on life under financialized capitalism. If 
this capitalism is, as Foster and McChesney (2012) have argued, becoming increasingly 
socially irrational on a worldwide scale, its persistence raises the perennial question of 
“social reproduction” (Caffentzis, 2013, 259). Namely: if irrational, how is it socially 
reproduced? At first blush, Girard’s concept of the scapegoat mechanism might seem to 
supply an answer. Such an initial impression is what has led Guénin-Paracini, et al. to press 
the mechanism into service in an attempt to explain how people are reconciled to 
capitalism’s financial crisis tendencies. Yet to displace the concept this way is to make a 
fundamental category error. Logically, the scapegoat mechanism is not a means by which 
contemporary capitalism is or could even possibly be reproduced. Instead, we hold that 
Girard’s thinking on the lineaments of scapegoating and persecution in modern times, as 
opposed to the classical scapegoating mechanism he posits, is helpful for the practical 
purpose of ensuring that resistance to financialization is based on an objective critique of 
capital and capitalism rather than a subjective, moralizing ‘critique of the capitalist’ 
(Bonefeld, 2014, 196). To avoid the political dangers of focusing on capital personified, 
which can all too easily slip into anti-Semitism and racism, Marxist analysis must remain 
fixed on financialized capitalism as a system. Understanding the systemic propensity for 
crisis is, we argue, precisely where Girardian mimetic theory can make a contribution to 
crisis theory.  
We readily acknowledge the importance of setting the scapegoating impulse within 
a wider class-relational context. Historically, as well as today, persons more vulnerable than 
bankers have been unfairly blamed for financial crises and other social ills under capitalism. 
For example, women workers were scapegoated – albeit in an everyday but not a classical 
Girardian sense – in the Great Depression (Humphries, 1976). More recently, op-ed pieces 
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in mainstream print media outlets routinely blamed working class members of racial 
minorities for the 2007 subprime meltdown (Squires, 2011). Given that Guénin-Paracini, et 
al. focus on financial elites and hence just one particular target of blame, our critique of their 
work does so too. Keeping this caveat in mind, our paper is structured as follows. First, we 
discuss Girard’s theory of mimeticism and his concept of the scapegoat mechanism. Second, 
we subject the arguments of Guénin-Paracini, et al. to a close analysis. Third, we show that 
Girard’s insights into scapegoating are useful for keeping the critique of financialized 
capitalism depersonalized. Fourth, we make links between Girardian mimetic theory and 
synthetic – Marxist and Keynesian – explanations of financial crisis. A brief conclusion 
rounds the discussion out.  
 
2.  Girard on Mimesis and Scapegoating  
 
Girard’s mimetic theory and his theory of scapegoating are interconnected but 
nevertheless temporally and logically distinct elements of the dynamic of his thought. They 
can therefore be separately introduced and independently evaluated. Girard developed his 
mimetic theory first so we begin there.  
 
2.1  Mimetic Desire.  Like Marx, Girard has a fundamentally social and relational view of 
human nature. As one of Girard’s interlocutors, Wolfgang Palaver, puts it, “human beings 
are constituted first and foremost by their relations to others” (Palaver, 2013, 132). Mimetic 
desire arises in this context. By “mimetic”, Girard means that desire does not stem from an 
essential human nature or the inner recesses of the psyche, but rather is based on imitating 
others. The idea is that, in particular sociohistorical circumstances, “human beings borrow 
their desires from models” (ibid., 58). The source of Girard’s insight is not the philosophical 
dialectical method per se but rather a close Hegel-inflected reading of classic literature – 
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principally the works of Cervantes, Stendhal, Proust, and Dostoyevsky – on which he based 
his first monograph: Deceit, Desire, and the Novel (Girard, 1965). As this pathbreaking work 
explains, mimetic desire has a triadic structure involving a relationship between the object, 
the desiring subject, and a mediator. When the subject feels unfulfilled, they look to others 
for examples of the objects they have that seem to fulfil them personally; the subject then 
seeks to copy that person or persons. Desiring an object because someone else either has the 
object or wants to get it casts the imitated person in the role of the mediator of the subject’s 
desire.  
In Girard’s view, the structure of mimetic (emulative) desire varies in line with the 
extent of differentiation and closure within hierarchical social orders. The more socially 
distant the mediator is from the subject, the less likely it is that the subject can closely copy 
the mediator – whose social status puts what they have out of the subject’s realistic reach. 
The “external” nature of the mediation (based on difference) limits the subject’s scope for 
transforming themselves in the mediator’s image (ibid., 119). External mediation functions 
more like a standard of reference to which subjects adhere, or a social convention to which 
they conform, than it does a model for reconstructing the self. Conversely, “internal 
mediation” of desire is based on the subject copying others who are close to their own 
circumstances (ibid., 92). Since the subject might realistically be able to get what the 
mediator has or wants, thereby becoming more like them, self-transformation in the 
mediator’s image is possible.  
In line with these general principles, Girard maintains that internally mediated 
mimetic desire is heightened on the one hand, and externally mediated mimesis is weakened 
on the other hand, by the decline of monarchical regimes. When “there is no longer God, 
king, or lord to link them to the universal,” Girard (1965, 65) writes, modern persons 
experience an existential lack. This is arguably exacerbated by the post-Enlightenment 
ideas of freedom and liberty that so troubled Dostoyevsky (Berdyaev, 1966). As norms and 
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conventions anchored in belief in a divine personage and respect for the authority of a 
monarch or the nobility attenuate, atomised and nominally “free” individuals seek to ground 
themselves by emulating figures from their everyday lives. Due to differences between 
subject and mediator diminishing, mediation increasingly becomes internal. Precisely 
because of the propinquity between the subject and the panoply of potential mediators 
(models of desire, that is), mimetic desire intensified by internal mediation is “contagious” – 
so that, like a cold, “one ‘catches’ a nearby desire” (Girard, 1965, 99).  
Girard’s fondness for figurative language does not, in our view, vitiate his 
perspicacity concerning how desires are socially shaped. Based on his insights, more 
rigorous work has set mimetic theory on a sound social-psychological footing (Livingston, 
1992). Some readers may still find his theory speculative. Girard developed it prior to 
becoming interested in anthropology so he does not supply an anthropo-philosophical 
account of the origins of mimeticism. Nevertheless, it is has not gone unnoticed within 
Marxism that human development and behavior are fundamentally mimetic. Walter 
Benjamin makes just such an observation (Benjamin, 2005a; 2005b). For our purposes, the 
anthropological and psychological wellspring of mimetic desire is less important than how 
it changes in contemporary capitalism. The important point for Marxist scholars is that, as 
Livingston (1992, 55) demonstrates, Girard’s theory entails the view that mimesis is 
fundamentally open “to contextual determinants.” It is thus consistent with the tenor of the 
theory for us to argue that, as capitalism becomes increasingly financialized, the shift from 
social standard-based external mediation to self-transformative internal mediation is neither 
ineluctable nor uniform across the spheres of production, distribution, and exchange. It is 
not that financial capitalism now occupies the place of God or the monarch. Rather, the 
more modest claim is that convention reinforcing (externally mediated) belief and behavior, 
which is analogous to the norm-abiding pattern of belief and behavior Girard points to under 
hierarchical social structures, comes to the fore within the financial circuit. In short, 
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external mediation reasserts itself there. This is a matter to which we shall return in the 
fifth section.  
 
2.2  Scapegoating.  The concept of the scapegoat mechanism is the centerpiece of the thesis 
Girard elaborates in his magisterial Violence and the Sacred (Girard, 1989), Things Hidden 
Since the Foundation of the World (Girard, 1987), and The Scapegoat (Girard, 1986). The 
mechanism explains how order is achieved within a particular type of society – archaic, 
small, lacking a formal judicial system, and crisis-prone to the point of extinction. This part 
of Girard’s oeuvre is oriented to answering the following question: what is the basis of 
social stability in societies wherein, due to unconstrained and cascading mimetic rivalry, 
violence is an ever-present threat to social cohesion?  
In the societies Girard has in mind, mimetic “rivalry…transforms desire into 
violence” (Girard, 1989, 169). Desire and violence become entwined in a vicious circle, as a 
violent act caused by a person’s desire for the rival’s object of desire, and attempt to get it, 
provokes retaliation in an act of vengeance. Mimetic violence results in combatants coming 
to resemble each other – “doubles” in Girardian parlance. The social order that precedes the 
unleashing of rivalrous desire is challenged when order-generating social differentiation 
breaks down. To the extent that these societies had no judicial system, a cascade of 
reciprocal violence continually threatened their very existence. According to Girard, in any 
such society that persisted over time, the scapegoat mechanism not only arrested violent 
reprisals before their devastating social consequences fully played out; it prevented relapses 
into self-propagating violence.  
Archaic society’s order-generating centrepiece is the “cultural mechanism of the 
surrogate victim” (ibid., 221), which is a bulwark against mutual destruction. The surrogate 
victim is the scapegoat – an eminently sacrificeable individual, randomly chosen from inside 
the community, onto whom community violence is deflected and whose sacrifice does not 
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provoke reprisal. It is “unanimous violence” (ibid., 99) against the scapegoat, in an act of 
sacrifice, that unites members of the community and ends the cycle of violence. Unlike 
mimetic (reciprocal) violence, unanimous violence is socially “purifying” (ibid., 49). As the 
surrogate victim restores social order, the victim tends to become endowed with special 
powers and thus sacralized, forming the keystone of the community’s cultural system. The 
original sacrificial act is re-enacted in new, preventative sacrificial rituals in which the ritual 
victim typically is an outsider – such as a slave, an animal or a stranger – the function of 
which is to forestall relapses into mimetic violence.  
Two points in the preceding condensed discussion of the scapegoat mechanism are 
noteworthy. First, the violence-preventing function of second-order sacrificial rituals is 
inherently friable. Its breakdown results in “the sacrificial crisis” (ibid., 44). This crisis 
occurs because ritualistic protections against violence, which often involve real violence 
towards the sacrificial victim who is a stand-in for the original surrogate victim, tend to 
attenuate over time. New rituals can emerge to stanch the ensuing violence, but the cycle 
only ceases when the sacrificial ritual becomes fully religious in nature. The practices of 
religion – through elaborate systems of ritual, prohibitions, and mythologies – foster 
“cultural stability” (ibid., 280). Over time, ritualistic violence directed at a sacrificial victim is 
transmuted into symbolic violence rather than real violence. Religion, therefore, acts as a 
“braking device” against a mimetic spiral of violence originating from within a community 
(ibid., 145). The second point is that religion only works this way because of a “collective 
self-mystification” (ibid., 83). Religion protects a community from emulative violence only 
insofar as community members do not understand that the religious rituals they participate 
in point beyond themselves, back to the sacrificial crisis and the original sacrificial act (of 
really killing a scapegoat) before that. This non-cognizance is necessary because the rituals 
are based on a sham: the scapegoat is innocent, and, if human, they were murdered.  
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Girard acknowledges that scapegoating still occurs (Girard, 2014). Yet he stresses 
that there are major differences between the type of scapegoating in modern societies and 
that operating in archaic societies. Principally, scapegoating no longer functions effectively 
to maintain and reproduce social order as it once did. This is because the system of sacrifice 
on which classic scapegoating relies has been brought to consciousness for modern persons 
through our Western cultural inheritance. A key element is Greek tragedy, which serves as 
the master-key to cultural myths that obscure the scapegoat mechanism (Girard, 1989, 202-
10). Ordinary people are tacitly aware of these things by means of culturally inherited 
tragedian and other understandings that are deeply sedimented in Western thought. For 
Girard, precisely because the scapegoat mechanism has been demystified and thus 
unmasked, modern scapegoating is often hackneyed and replete with cynicism, whereas its 
classic precursor is not.  
In summary, Girard constructs an elegant argument concerning the inherent 
friability of ritualized violence as a handbrake on retributive violence in archaic societies, 
thereby highlighting the protective function of religion. The crisis tendencies Girard 
emphasizes are not economic but rather cultural in nature. The particular cultural crisis he 
identifies, the sacrificial crisis is, in the final instance, resolved by religion. Clearly, one 
cannot merely superimpose this theory onto contemporary Western capitalist societies 
experiencing financial crisis, each of which has a punishment-based justice system that – 
irrespective of its role in perpetuating capitalism (Collins, 1982) – reliably constrains 
violence by preventing retaliatory acts. Yet the authors we critique in the next section do 
just that.  
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3. Critique of Guénin-Paracini, Gendron, and Morales 
 
This section examines whether the scapegoating strand of Girard’s thought provides 
insights into financial crises that are compatible with Marxist understandings. When 
bankers and financiers are morally blamed for financial crises (Whittle and Mueller, 2012), 
does the scapegoat mechanism make this phenomenon intelligible? We answer in the 
negative. This is based on our evaluation of work by Guénin-Paracini et al. (2014), which 
rates as the strongest application Girard’s concept of the scapegoat mechanism to financial 
crisis moments. We use Guénin-Paracini, et al. as a test case to determine whether this 
mechanism can explain how capitalism in crisis is socially reproduced.  
Guénin-Paracini et al., go so far as to assert that the scapegoat mechanism 
underprops crisis-prone “neoliberal” capitalism. In reference to the Global Financial Crisis, 
the culprits they single out are bankers in capitalist, market-guided economies – principally 
the United States, Britain, and France. Due to the scapegoat mechanism, they argue, crises 
“often are collectively construed as resulting from frauds” such that “the blame is principally 
put on specific actors whose lack of morality is denounced”; the net result is that “this 
individualizing line of interpretation protects the regime from systemic questioning” (ibid., 
342). Their argument has three weaknesses: (1) the admission of the possibility of classic 
scapegoating as a deliberate strategy; (2) the blurring of lines of causality between 
neoliberalism and scapegoating; and (3) the conflation of original and second-order sacrifice. 
The first problem stems from being too cavalier in superimposing the concept of the 
scapegoating mechanism onto contemporary capitalism. The second is a logical error. The 
third fails to take account of how punishment varies between the different forms of sacrifice 
Girard identifies.  
 
 11 
 
3.1  Scapegoating as a Deliberate Strategy.  For the classic scapegoat mechanism to operate it 
must, according to Girard, remain hidden from view. By the very nature of Girard’s own 
argument, this must be so. Powerful individuals and groups cannot consciously use 
scapegoating as a social order-generating strategy. Guénin-Paracini et al., insist, however, 
that “powerful stakeholders may, indeed, seek to trigger scapegoating processes” (Guénin-
Paracini et al., 2014, 344), to blame individuals or groups for an economic crisis in order to 
deflect attention from the systemic causes of the crisis. This claim, however, is inconsistent 
with their argument that the scapegoat mechanism produces order in the same way today as 
it did in archaic societies. In the latter, according to Girard, the mechanism functioned this 
way precisely because it was opaque.  
In the interests of coherency, in order to demonstrate that the powerful can trigger 
the classic scapegoat mechanism, the authors must make one of two logical moves. Either 
they must show that there is something substantially different about modern society that 
renders this order-promoting mechanism transparent, at least to those in powerful 
positions. Or they must redefine the concept of the scapegoat mechanism such that it does 
not require the powerful to lack awareness of how the mechanism operates – which would 
mean, in effect, that the mechanism operates in a manner contrary to how Girard says it 
does. Guénin-Paracini, et al. do neither of these two things. Instead, they argue that modern 
societies are regressing to premodern forms; so the differences between modern and 
premodern are reducing. They believe that “the world as governed by neoliberals exhibits 
many similarities with primitive tribes of ancient times” (ibid., 346). For consistency’s sake, 
on this line of argument, the scapegoat mechanism should today be less transparent to the 
ruling and ruled classes alike (as it was in those times) – not more so, as the authors imply.  
Without fully and openly reconceptualizing the scapegoat mechanism, Guénin-
Paracini, et al. accord explanatory primacy to the ability of politicians and social elites to 
know about the mechanism. They maintain, for example, “in the 1930s, the process of 
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scapegoating triggered by a significant crisis was not sufficiently intense to prevent the 
liberal regime from being systematically questioned and overthrown” (ibid., 340-41). At this 
time, though, “the political class was able to keep enough independence of mind for not 
being inescapably trapped into individualizing lines of interpretation”; indeed, “they were 
still able to invent… a distinct form of governance” (ibid., 341) to replace liberalism – 
namely Keynesianism. Following this argument to its logical conclusion, politicians must 
have been cognisant of the scapegoating process in order to avoid becoming caught up in it. 
Politicians could not stop “the liberal regime from being systematically questioned and 
overthrown” (ibid.). But because they were aware of the scapegoating process, and thus not 
caught up in it, they could set up a new system – rather than being “inescapably trapped” 
into blaming individuals.  
In the contrasting case of the Global Financial Crisis, the authors argue that 
politicians were subsumed by the scapegoating process. But the scapegoating was intense 
enough to lay the blame at the feet of individuals, thereby preventing the neoliberal regime 
from being challenged sufficiently for it to be overturned. Supposedly, in the post-crisis 
period, politicians did not trigger scapegoating because the process was already under way, 
and they were swept along with the crowd. On the logic of this argument, however, if 
circumstances had been different – as they were in the 1930s – politicians could have seen 
through the scapegoating mechanism and either triggered scapegoating or made a 
conscious decision to go along with it. That Guénin-Paracini et al., admit of the latter 
possibilities shows them stretching the classic scapegoating concept further than it can go. 
Simply put, they misapply the concept. In Girard’s sense, the scapegoat mechanism is a 
social substructure dependent for its functioning on remaining hidden. As such, the 
mechanism cannot be used as a weapon by any powerful group intent on blaming the 
innocent.  
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3.2  Neoliberalism and Scapegoating.  The lineaments of neoliberalism sketched by the authors 
are less important for this present part of our critique than the fact that they blur the lines 
of causation, such that the scapegoat mechanism becomes both the cause and the effect of 
neoliberalism. In regards to “neoliberal governmentality” the authors strikingly suggest 
that “this form of governance originally emerged from a founding scapegoating – that is, the 
scapegoating of the state, viewed by neoliberals as responsible for all ills” (Guénin-Paracini 
et al., 2014, 345). If they are correct, scapegoating brought neoliberalism into existence; the 
former is the latter’s originary cause. Yet, elsewhere in the article they claim that there are 
in fact “sui generis features of neoliberalism” and that these “might explain the particularly 
federative nature of the witch hunts it tends to foster” (ibid., 341). It is clear that, with 
respect to scapegoating, the authors believe neoliberalism has causal power; that it can 
cause scapegoating. In 2008, neoliberalism purportedly both generated scapegoating and 
focussed it on bankers in a manner that had a system-reproducing effect. This scapegoating 
worked as an in-built protection mechanism for neoliberalism, which by blaming individuals 
for systemic failures, reproduced neoliberal governance. 
Yet there is a logical problem here. If neoliberalism is sui generis, and if its 
uniqueness gave rise to Girardian scapegoating within the economic domain, could 
neoliberalism have been caused by scapegoating in the first place? The answer, logically 
speaking, is a resounding “no.” A unique entity (neoliberalism) cannot be caused by 
something that is its effect (scapegoating). To say otherwise is to violate the law of non-
contradiction, for the effect must have existed prior to its cause and thus the effect both 
existed and did not exist simultaneously. One logical escape hatch might be for Guénin-
Paracini, et al. to argue that the “founding scapegoating” of the state was not a matter of 
economics but rather of politics. Not only do they not make this argument, it would seem 
unavailable to them since they would need to deny that neoliberalism is an economic 
doctrine.  
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3.3  Conflation of Original and Second-Order Sacrifice.  Guénin-Paracini, et al. conflate two 
different forms of sacrifice and do not recognize how punishment differs between them. 
According to Girard, actual punishment – punitive action – is inherent to the scapegoat 
mechanism. The original surrogate victim is punished; likewise the second-order 
(substitute) sacrificial victim is punished, sometimes violently. This is precisely why 
mimetic crises occur – when punishment turns violent, violence becomes contagious. The 
threat of mimetic violence only ceases when sacrificial rituals are reconstituted as religious 
rituals, which do not actually punish victims but rather symbolically re-enact their 
punishment.  
For Girard, symbolic punishment is only effective as a means of building social 
solidarity if the punishment takes on a religious form and re-enacts an originary 
scapegoating. It is only in the sense of a such a re-enactment of originary scapegoating that 
it is correct to say – with regard to scapegoats being punished – that “the punishment is 
sometimes only symbolically inflicted” (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014, 328, original emphasis). 
Yet the only past scapegoating the authors refer to is the blaming of the state for the ills of 
Keynesianism, which ushers in neoliberalism. It is hard to see how bankers, circa 2008, 
could be construed as second-order sacrificial stand-ins who were symbolically punished for 
the state having been scapegoated in an earlier (Keynesian) period.  
The upshot is this: the populace and politicians blaming bankers for the Global 
Financial Crisis can only have occurred under the social logic of the classic scapegoat 
mechanism if real punishments were meted out to them as culprits. In the case of the Global 
Financial Crisis, however, it is difficult to find examples, from within Great Britain, France 
and the United States, of the punishment of bankers in the latter part of 2008 and early in 
2009 – which Guénin-Paracini, et al. single out as the time of punitive action. Hence they 
redefine “punishment” as symbolic punishment, in the following manner: 
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It can be argued that bankers had not “really” been punished…. After all, senior 
banking executives were not put in prison, nor even criminally prosecuted (at the 
time). Nevertheless, the dismissal of a few of them, the cut in their salaries, their 
public auditions, the hanging of their effigies in the street and the regulation of their 
activities, while mainly symbolic, had been widely covered by the media and had 
offered, as such, a spectacle of punishment. (ibid., 332, original emphasis.) 
 
Of the eleven banker “dismissals” the authors cite, however, media reports show that the 
majority were in fact resignations (and none involved bankers in the United States).1 
Regarding pay cuts, the authors say that “in the USA and in most European jurisdictions, 
the political authorities deprived bankers of part of their wages” (ibid., 330). Whether this 
happened throughout Western Europe is immaterial; the authors cite examples only from 
France, Britain, and the United States that hinge on the restriction or non-payment of 
bonuses – which, by their very nature, entail the non-award of a discretionary payment 
rather than a salary cut per se. We limit our comments to Britain and the United States, 
where sources are available in English. On Britain, the authors point out that Gordon 
Brown precluded the awarding of bonuses to executives of banks the government bailed out. 
Yet Bruce and Skovoroda (2013) suggest that after the crisis the British authorities talked 
tough but did little to curb bonus payouts. There is also a question mark over the wage-
deprivation claim in the American milieu. The authors say that, in February 2009, “Barack 
Obama put a $500,000 cap on bankers’ salaries” (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014, 330). To be 
                                                          
1 Axel Miller and Pierre Richard of the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, and Tom McKillop, 
Johnny Cameron and Fred Goodwin of Royal Bank of Scotland resigned in the wake of a 
bailout. Lord Stevenson and Andy Hornby (respectively the Chairman and Chief Executive 
of HBOS) were asked to resign by the previous Chief Executives of the Bank of Scotland 
and Royal Bank of Scotland. 
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precise, a Treasury Department press release on 4 February 2009 announced guidelines for 
companies (including banks) in receipt of “exceptional assistance” from the Treasury. These 
guidelines were arguably more of an effort to realign incentives than an exercise in 
punishing wrongdoers (Walker, 2010); senior executives of the assisted organizations could 
still receive incentive compensation in the form of shares over and above the $500,000 
payment limit. Furthermore, the so-called “cap” was never written into law – it was 
excluded from President Obama’s American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) which 
was passed on 17 February 2009. The Act tightened conditions under which bonuses could 
be paid by institutions receiving government aid, but by weakening earlier Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) provisions it gave bankers a way around the restrictions (Wallach, 
2015). It is no surprise that Wallach (2015, 135) describes ARRA as being, from the 
standpoint of the general public, “insufficiently zealous in restricting bonuses.” It did not 
seem much of a punishment, whether symbolic or otherwise.  
The authors adhere to the Girardian thesis that scapegoating in the ancient world 
involved the “punishment of the culprit” (Guénin-Paracini et al., 2014, 321). Unable to find 
strong examples of bankers being punished in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, they 
construe punishment as “mainly symbolic.” Yet a lack of evidence about salary cuts calls 
into question the extent even of this symbolic punishment. Moreover, as we argue above, 
Girard contends that symbolic punishment underwrites social cohesion only in the context 
of the cultic re-enactment of a punitive act of scapegoating in the distant past. The blaming 
of bankers for the Global Financial Crisis does not remotely resemble such an act.  
To summarize, even on the most charitable interpretation, Guénin-Paracini, et al. 
stretch Girard’s theory of classic scapegoating to its logical breaking point. To the extent 
that they make the boldest attempt to use this theory to develop a neo-Marxist 
understanding of financial crisis, their failure calls the whole project into question. Girard’s 
theory of scapegoating simply does not fit the task. Girard himself suggests that in 
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contemporary societies the closest approximation to the social solidarity-promoting 
function of the scapegoat mechanism is the persecution of others “in the name of victims” 
(Girard, 2014, 37). His point is that, when victimhood becomes a mantra, the persecutory 
impulse almost unconsciously and unquestioningly comes to the fore. But this phenomenon 
is limited by legal systems that mete out justice and restrain the vengeful crowd. As a 
result, even much reviled individuals and groups (bankers, for example) cannot serve as 
effective social order-promoting scapegoats, cast in the mould of scapegoats in archaic 
societies. Not only does the scapegoating mechanism no longer operate, it cannot operate in 
contemporary societies. Western capitalist societies have distinctive social institutions that 
are absent from archaic societies, including a formal judicial system that stanches 
retributory violence.  
 
4.  From Personalized Critique to Systemic Analysis of Financial Crisis 
 
Girard’s discovery of the scapegoat mechanism is not, we believe, where his legacy for 
Marxism lies. To claim in the manner of Guénin-Paracini, et al. that this mechanism 
functions today to ameliorate class conflict at times of financial crisis is to make a 
fundamental category error. Rather, the broad lesson to be drawn from what Girard says 
about contemporary scapegoating is that any attempt to blame individuals for financial 
crises must be eschewed, since it can lead to the persecution of racial and ethnic minorities. 
Individualized blame attribution militates against systemic explanation and, in so doing, 
deflects attention from underlying issues.  
Girardian cognizance of the persecutory impulse is particularly useful in avoiding a 
“personalized critique of capital” (Bonefeld, 2014, 197). In such a critique, the attribution of 
personal guilt for economic and financial ills implies that certain blameworthy persons are 
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themselves responsible for depredatory conditions under capitalism. This can have 
disastrous political consequences. As Bonefeld puts it insightfully:  
 
The personalized critique of capitalist social relations is open to abuse from the outset. 
It thinks akin to a register of blame, and condemns the identified party as a power that 
hides behind the economic phenomena, sucking the living life out of the national 
community of hard-working people. (Bonefeld, 2014, 197.) 
 
When the figures of finance are seen as parasitic upon industry and inimical to the interests 
of the industrial working class, the attribution of guilt can lead the Left down the track of 
nationalism rather than internationalism. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, 
fascist ideology uses scapegoats as a justification for rebuilding the nation (Buck, 2008). 
When the purportedly guilty parties belong to a distinct religio-cultural grouping, intense 
hatred can result. Antisemitism is a case in point. It is distinct from racial scapegoating, 
whereby the “racialized Other” is regarded as inimical to national interests precisely because 
it has national roots and threatens social cohesion (ibid., 199). Antisemitism weaves together 
two different tropes. On the one hand, it “projects the Other as both rootless and all-
powerful”, thereby signifying that the threat to the nation is from without; on the other 
hand, it “summons the idea of finance and speculators as merchants of greed” (ibid., 199-
200).  
The persecution of Jewish bankers by the Nazis, whom they blamed along with the 
Versailles powers for the German depression, has been documented by Harold (2001). 
Clearly this did not amount to scapegoating in a classic Girardian sense of the scapegoat 
mechanism being in operation, because the Nazis knew exactly what they were doing. The 
Left has not been immune from similar temptations when accounting for unwelcome 
economic and political developments. One of the most blatant was the early English 
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Marxist, H.M. Hyndman, who in lurid prose argued that a Jewish cabal was driving modern 
capitalism, and that Jewish financiers were responsible for the Second Boer War of 1899-
1902 (Hirshfield, 1981). 
 To blame mere “personifications of capital”, such as the figure of the banker, for 
financial crises is to ignore how capitalism “asserts itself as independent force over and 
through” individuals (Bonefeld, 2014, 195). The point is that the critique of capital should 
concentrate on the dynamics of capitalism as a system. According to Tabb (2010), however, 
Marxists operate in practice at several different levels when analysing crises, sometimes 
focussing on the core dynamics of capitalism, and at other times on particular events such as 
the failure of an individual business – such as Credit Anstalt or Lehman Brothers. But most 
of the time, he argues, “Marx and Marxists consider crisis at the level of an abstract model 
of capitalism” viewing “the economic system as an entity” (Tabb, 2010, 306). A 
comprehensive review of Marxist theories of crisis is beyond our paper’s scope, but some 
classic and contemporary examples will suffice to illustrate this point.  
 In the classic Marxist analysis of finance capital, Hilferding (1981, 239) contended 
that a cycle of prosperity, crisis and depression was inevitable under capitalism. Hilferding 
identified disproportionalities between parts of the economy and the decline in the rate of 
profit as the main causes of economic crisis (Howard and King, 1989, 97-8). Monetary crises 
usually followed the initial economic downturn: the banking system suffered internal and 
external drains of reserves, and the rapid deflation of the stock market often precipitated a 
banking crisis (Hilferding, 1981, 267-76). Although crises were preceded by reckless 
lending, Hilferding did not place any personal or collective blame on bankers for being 
caught up in the cycle.   
 Marx did not offer a finished theory of crisis, but elements of his thinking, especially 
in relation to financialization and globalization, shed valuable light on the economic 
upheavals of the early twenty-first century (Tabb, 2010, 306). The late twentieth century 
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was marked by relative stagnation in the productive sectors of Western economies. 
Globalization put industry under pressure, a process intensified by the expansion of “vulture 
finance capital” which burdened producers with unsustainable levels of debt. Speculative 
financial operations boosted certain sectors including real estate, albeit temporarily. 
Financial regulators were compromised by their close ties to leading investment banks, a 
state of affairs amounting to “American crony capitalism” (Tabb, 2010, 317). All that was 
required for a crisis was a trigger event such as the bursting of the housing bubble. 
Similarly, Foster and Magdoff (2009) argue that the development of a bloated financial 
sector addicted to the proliferation of paper claims was a response to stagnation in the real 
economy. They emphasize that poorer citizens, trapped between falling real incomes and 
rocketing house prices, were encouraged to borrow more than ever before. Financialization, 
however, offered no lasting solution to the tendency of the economy to sink into crisis and 
recession, and even added to instability. Shaikh (2016, 724) finds that the 2007-08 crisis was 
“an absolutely normal part of a long-standing recurring pattern in capitalist accumulation in 
which crises occur once long booms have given way to long downturns.” Drawing on 
Kondratieff as much as on Marx, Shaikh argues that a turning point was reached when the 
boom caused by falling interest rates, compressed labour incomes, and the growth of debt 
ran out of steam.  
 Marx’s letters to the New York Daily Tribune in the 1850s on the affairs of the 
French investment bank, Crédit Mobilier, may illuminate recent events, according to 
Ricciardi (2015). In these letters, Marx developed the rudiments of a theory of how the 
financial sector could prompt crises. The Crédit Mobilier issued its own securities, and 
employed the receipts in the capital markets in speculative operations. The Crédit Mobilier 
profited from the margin between the interest and dividends that it paid out and the interest 
and dividends it received, as well as from the purchase and sale of financial assets. A 
pyramid of debt ensued. Productive firms became burdened with financial obligations that 
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could destroy them in a slump. The activities of the Crédit Mobilier distorted the 
functioning of capital markets, and productive investment became the adjunct to the 
financial claims that it supported. Savers preferred to acquire paper assets - essentially 
fictitious capital - that could appreciate rapidly than to supply funds to genuine enterprises. 
French industry and government policy were subordinated to high finance (Ricciardi, 2015, 
499-522). This system was unstable. When expectations were missed, the debt pyramid 
would collapse, forcing the authorities to intervene through the central bank. For the Crédit 
Mobilier, the day of reckoning came in 1867 (Cassis, 2010, 50). Ricciardi (2015, 522, original 
emphasis) concludes that “Marx’s analysis of the Crédit Mobilier should provide insight on 
how to think about banking and finance in the larger context of contemporary 
accumulation.” The housing bubble of the early 2000s, for instance, entailed a serious 
misallocation of capital, whilst the rapid growth of housing-related derivatives constituted 
fictitious capital. 
The message of this section can be summarized as follows. Girard’s theory of the 
scapegoat mechanism explains little about contemporary capitalism’s specifically financial 
crisis tendencies. Nevertheless, Girardian cognizance of the persecutory impulse can serve 
as a ‘watch-dog principle’ (Clarke, 2014, 20) for redirecting slips into personalizing critique 
back towards the rich Marxist vein of systems-focused analysis. Economists working in the 
Marxist tradition provide robust explanations of the financial cycle and financial crises that 
do not rely on the personal failings of individual bankers or speculators or groups thereof. 
This, of course, is not to say that such scholars are always consistent in their terminology. 
As Tabb points out, they may operate on several different levels, but the main one is the 
systemic one.  
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5.  Mimetic Theory, Crisis Sites, and Financial Crisis  
 
If Girard’s awareness of how scapegoating and persecution are interlinked in the 
modern world can help to keep resistance to financialization depersonalized, his writings on 
mimetic desire can actually contribute to a systemic explanation of factors leading to 
financial crisis. Significantly, Girardian mimetic theory has the potential to bridge 
Keynesian and Marxist theories of this phenomenon. Recognizing and reaffirming the 
validity and utility of the distinction between internal mediation and external mediation of 
mimetic desire is the springboard for this project. To reiterate, internal mediation involves 
emulating a mediator – a person in whose image the subject can transform themselves by 
copying the mediator’s acquisitive desires and how these are fulfilled. This process 
potentially sinks deep into the psyche and the self. External mediation, by contrast, is 
characterized by norm-abiding belief and behaviour that reinforces supra-individual 
structures; it lacks the personification of desire and self-transformation in the mediator’s 
image which is the sine qua non of internal mediation.  
The thrust of Girard’s argument is that when traditional social hierarchies break 
down, internal mediation increasingly substitutes for external mediation. Girard wrote 
almost literally nothing on the question of whether the environing context of capitalist 
social relations reinforces this process, distorts it, or has no effect. It has been left to 
scholars working in his wake to connect the tendencies of capitalism to the mediation of 
desire. There are two different schools of thought. Proponents of the first include Girardian 
scholars such as Scott Cowdell and Wolfgang Palaver; the second is represented by André 
Orléan – the Regulation School theorist mentioned in Section 1. In our view, their differing 
views can be reconciled by employing a distinction drawn by Laibman (2007, 115), within 
his “crisis sites” model, between “the consumption site” and “the financial site.” For our 
purposes, the content of each site’s crisis tendencies is less important than the validity of the 
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distinction itself. Laibman’s logical demonstration that different tendencies and processes 
operate at each site (though they are interconnected) gives us warrant to argue that the 
primary locus of internal mediation is the consumption site, whereas external mediation re-
emerges at the financial site. The distinction between the two forms of mediation draws 
attention to the different subjective and objective forces at play at these sites, which is why 
we think it merits further investigation.  
Cowdell and Palaver both believe that internal mediation reigns supreme under 
capitalism in the consumerist era. Recall that, for Girard, the characteristic feature of this 
mediation – the shrinking distance between subject and mediator – is not physical but 
rather social. The shift away from “conspicuous consumption” by members of the capitalist 
class during the post-World War II long boom, as the balance of class forces swung in 
favour of the working class (Laibman, 2007, 107), lends weight to the Girardian thesis that 
external mediation of desire (wherein many desired objects of consumption are beyond the 
reach of working-class-members) yielded to internal mediation (wherein objects of desire 
are attainable through mass consumption). Accordingly, there is much to be said for 
Cowdell’s (2013, 124) notion that “late modern capitalism” supplies innumerable personified 
models of acquisitive desire through mass media and advertising. In a similar vein, Palaver 
(2013, 69) writes of how emulating the “heroes of advertising” holds out the promise of 
bolstering one’s distinctiveness in a self-focused (and hence ideologically saturated) culture 
that prizes individualism.  
Going beyond Cowdell and Palaver, we contend that links can be made between 
heightened internal mediation and capitalism’s fundamental crisis tendencies. Arguably, the 
“politics of new need creation” (Harvey, 2010, 107) in capitalism, which serves to bolster 
capital accumulation in Department II, is actually founded on the creation of nominally 
choiceworthy desires. This entails manipulating internally mediated mimetic desire so that 
new desires for consumption goods are created. If advertising heightens internal mediation, 
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thereby prompting working-class-members to emulate personified advertising models, and 
if aggregate demand increases as a result, this can help to forestall an underconsumption 
crisis. The limits to this process are set by shifts in the balance of class forces in favour of 
the capitalist class. In particular, from late last century in the U.S., “upper-class 
consumption” began to exhibit models of desire that were for wage-earners increasingly 
unattainable – from luxury cars to ostentatious condominiums to generous executive 
compensation packages (Laibman, 2007, 107). To take one step further, the system-
reproducing effects of emulable models of consumption – through internal mediation – 
stalled as the ideology of egalitarianism was pierced, and thus the legitimacy of capitalism 
was potentially called into question, by visibly vast disparities between social classes.  
While Girardians like Cowdell and Palaver – like Girard himself – are more 
interested in cultural than economic crises, their general line of argument is compatible with 
Marxist understandings of crisis tendencies at the consumption site. Yet their conclusion 
that internal mediation of desire is the primary form of mimeticism in capitalism is merely a 
by-product of their decision to focus on consumerism and hence that site. As a result, they 
fail to see how external mediation might operate within the financial cycle and thus at the 
financial site. This is where mimetic theory can augment Marxist explanations of financial 
crisis that draw on Keynesian principles. 
 Aspects of Keynesian thinking dovetail with mimetic approaches that stress external 
mediation. Keynes argued that fluctuations in investment intentions are driven by 
fluctuations in business confidence or “animal spirits.” Optimism and pessimism among 
decision makers are contagious. This is also the case in financial markets where the current 
market value of a share or bond depends on what each player thinks the other players 
believe it is worth. Keynes compared this to entering a newspaper competition to predict the 
winner of a beauty contest. A promising strategy is to estimate which contestant the 
average person would choose, but on reflection it would be even better to pick the 
 25 
 
contestant the average person would think the average person would choose, and so on. 
Determining what a share is worth, then, involves each trader trying to think like the rest 
of the market. If, for example, everyone thinks the market is in a positive mood then the 
price could take off (Keynes, 1936).  Minsky (1982; 2008) and Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2011) show how waves of euphoria and despair develop, sometimes initiated by quite minor 
events, resulting in large swings in activity punctuated by crises. Keynesian approaches, 
however, tend to overlook conflict over the distribution of income or the rate of profit as 
factors affecting business confidence and decisions. 
Keynesian and Marxist approaches to understanding financial cycles and crashes are 
in many respects reconciled in Orléan’s recent volume. Orléan (2014) grounds his work, 
albeit far from uncritically, in a discussion of Marx’s theory of value, but he also reinforces 
Keynes’s analysis of the instability of financial markets with insights from Girard’s mimetic 
hypothesis specifically concerning external mediation. The argument runs as follows. 
Securities have no objective worth because the future is uncertain (ibid., 189-96). Long-term 
investors place a subjective valuation on the securities that they hold, but this is likely to 
differ from the immediate market value. Financial markets provide long-term investors with 
liquidity and short-term speculators with opportunities. The current market price is 
determined, as in Keynes’s beauty contest, by market participants’ perception of what their 
peers will accept. External mediation operates as these perceptions crystallize into a 
“conventional belief” that functions as a supra-individual “standard of reference” (ibid., 220). 
To the extent that the majority of participants end up regarding “conformity to the 
convention” as a strategy for success, “the behavior of the group can be anticipated simply 
by copying the convention” (ibid.). This is how externally mediated mimeticism re-emerges, 
through convention reinforcing belief and behavior. Participants are not copying each other 
or transforming themselves in the image of personified advertising models (à la internal 
mediation), but rather are deferring to a social standard – a “belief that imposes itself on 
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individual minds” (ibid.), as it were. Put differently, it is by means of the standard that actors 
copy one another’s strategies. In this self-referential, Girardian/Keynesian financial world 
bubbles easily emerge, only to implode later in the light of disappointments (ibid., 241-309).  
Admittedly, Orléan’s account of the financial crisis of 2007-09 is slanted towards 
Keynesian as opposed to Marxist interpretations. There is considerable overlap, for 
example, between his approach and that of Keynesians such as Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2011). Orléan describes a period of growing “euphoria” in the early years of the twenty-first 
century. This was based in part on the “convention,” determined self-referentially, that 
housing prices would not fall, nor would the market valuation of the derivatives that they 
supported. Bubbles emerged, particularly in the sub-prime sector. It was rational to run 
with the bulls; most players thought they would be smart enough to get out prior to any 
change of fortune. When the good news came to an end in 2007, sentiment went in to 
reverse. Once participants in the financial market gained the impression that their peers 
were panicking they started to panic too, sending asset prices down even more rapidly and 
pushing some financial institutions into illiquidity and/or insolvency. Surprisingly, Orléan 
neglects the role of key Marxian value-ratios such as the rate of profit and the rate of 
exploitation – and by implication the balance of class forces – as factors affecting business 
confidence and capitalist decision making.  Still, creative syntheses of Marx and Keynes 
suggest it is possible to add this dimension (Goldstein, 2008).  
We can sum up this section by remarking that it is by no means self-contradictory to 
argue that internal mediation operates at the consumption site, while external mediation 
simultaneously becomes entrenched at the financial site through the emergence of widely 
held conventions among self-referential financial market players. The distinction between 
internal and external mediation provides a way of expressing the idea that the inner life of 
the social subject is targeted at the consumption site in a manner that is qualitatively 
different from the mimetic processes which operate at the financial site to produce financial 
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bubbles. In the final analysis, the different forms of mediatory mimeticism channel the 
contradictions of capitalism. To the extent that “the ultimate determinacy of capitalist 
contradiction is reinforced” by examining the overlap between the crisis sites – as Laibman 
(2007, 115) puts it – more work needs to be done to explore how internal and external 
mediation are differently expressed across the two aforementioned sites.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 While René Girard’s voluminous writings contain flashes of insight that make them 
a useful resource for informing Marxist analysis of financial crises, his work must be 
approached with a certain degree of circumspection. Girardian ideas and concepts cannot 
merely be transposed in an unreconstituted form down to contemporary capitalism. Indeed, 
in the years following the publication of Violence and the Sacred Girard repeatedly expressed 
concern about misapplications of his scapegoating conceptual framework, explicitly 
cautioning against “impressionistic applications of the theory” (Girard, 1987, 34). It is just 
such impressionism to which Guénin-Paracini, et al. subscribe. To refract financial crises 
through the lens of a theory about the originary acts that brought primitive religion into 
existence is to risk both catachresis and anachronism.  
 Nevertheless, Girard’s thoughts on scapegoating and the persecutory impulse are, in 
our view, a live option for ensuring that resistance to financialization remains true to the 
tenets of Marxist crisis theory by focusing squarely on capitalism as a system of social 
relations, as opposed to the individuals – whatever their level of wealth, ostentatiousness, 
greed and blameworthiness – who are the agents of the system. As far as producing a 
systemic explanation of the factors precipitating financial crisis goes, however, the real 
promise of Girardian mimetic theory is to promote a rapprochement between Keynesian and 
Marxist theories of financial crisis. In this area, a future direction for Marxist research is to 
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inquire more fully into the mutual complementarity of the concepts of internal mediation 
and external mediation as tools for investigating how mimetic thought and behavior 
manifests within the consumption and financial sites. In summary, we believe that there are 
strong prospects for using Girard to inform Marxist research into a range of contemporary 
economic and social problems that stem from capitalism’s financial crisis-potential. Yet if 
the dynamics of Girardian thought are truly to shed new light on the causes and 
consequences of financial crisis, the work must be undertaken carefully and with rigour. 
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